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Abstract: Despite the widespread attention to capital investments in land and prop-
erty around the globe, the active re-regulating role of the neoliberal state in processes
of “accumulation by dispossession” remains underexplored. Through an in-depth look
at the dispossession of highly fragmented and loosely regulated private land for wind-
farm investments on Crete’s eastern corner, Sitia, this paper re-affirms the political nature
of the forcible appropriation of land for large-scale investments; dissects the specific
mechanisms in which the state dispossesses land on behalf of investors and promotes
the forcible appropriation of land from below; and problematises the dialectic relation-
ship of both rupture and continuity between crisis and inherited, path-dependent rela-
tions embedded in land. The transformation of Sitia’s loosely regulated, informal
relations on land is made possible through the mobilisation of the state’s bureaucratic
and normalising powers, which redefine the concept of forest and dispossess through
classifying land as such.
Keywords: land dispossession, state classification, forestry land, windfarms, crisis,
Crete
Introduction
Since the 1980s, the world “fever” of capital investments in land and property
has attracted significant and growing scholarly attention: from political ecology
(Calvario et al. 2017; White et al. 2012), peasant studies (Jansen 2015), Marxism
and political economy (Oya 2013), anthropology (Li 2014) and sociology (Levien
2013) to the World Bank (2011) mainstream economics, the “land grab” debate
has been investigated from myriad different angles. While the “global land grab”
has become a “catch-all phrase” (Borras and Franco 2010), it is no surprise that
most academic efforts focus on cases of dispossession in the global South: this is
where thousands of acres of land have been dispossessed, an unprecedented pro-
portion of people displaced and livelihoods destroyed. Land dispossession—the
forceful expropriation of land for accumulation’s sake—is, however, not confined
to the “peripheries” of the global economy: it occurs in “capitalistically advanced”
Europe too (Franco and Borras 2013; Hadjimichalis 2014a).
This has been particularly evident since 2008, within the conditions of a capital-
ist crisis of global reach. The post-crisis strategy has been an attempt to put not
just capitalism, but neoliberal capitalism back on its feet (Aalbers 2013); it has
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reinforced austerity, the dismantling of labour rights, and the privatisation and
dispossession of land and common resources across Europe in uneven ways.
Building upon the eurozone’s structural inequalities, the “bailout” programmes
and Memoranda of Understanding have particularly targeted loosely regulated
land and property in southern European economies (Hadjimichalis 2014a,
2014b); the case of Greece, where I situate the study presented in this paper, is a
particularly good example of this. Greece’s spatial policy has been dramatically
transformed in the decade since the 2008 crash. The public debt has been
methodically constructed as a crucial lever of dispossession (Hadjimichalis 2014a),
and the plethora of state-administrated “rescue” mechanisms has resulted in an
overproduction of institutional and legislative changes under “fast-track” and “ex-
ceptional” procedures. As part of this “regime of accumulation” (Hadjimichalis
2014a), the forcible appropriation and redistribution of land is regarded as a key
solution to the country’s debt crisis (Vourekas 2013) and has set a new paradigm
in the relation between fiscal and spatial policy (Klabatsea 2012). Investors have
been intruding massively into the purchase and leasing of land and the real estate
system, looking for privileged positions for, inter alia, high-quality tourism (Had-
jimichalis 2014a) and both “green” and “un-green” developments (see Apos-
tolopoulou and Adams 2015; Siamanta 2019); the latter are both part of the well
researched increasing neoliberalisation of land and natural resources for profit all
around the globe (e.g. see Fairhead et al. 2012; McCarthy and Prudham 2004;
Smith 2006).
Both within and well beyond Greece, the 2008 financial crash has generated
new momentum for state interventions in land acquisitions (Cotula 2012): the dis-
possession of land involves the direct participation of the state, and its willingness
to mediate in the process of the land’s forcible redistribution (Wolford et al.
2013). Despite its radical origins, the “land grabbing” debate has, however, been
increasingly absorbed by mainstream, depoliticised, and descriptive perceptions of
development (Borras and Franco 2010; Levien 2013). This paper seeks to reaffirm
the active role and the specific ways in which the neoliberal state dispossesses
rural private land through an in-depth look at a large-scale renewable energy
investment on Crete’s Eastern corner, Sitia, where Terna Energy, the investing
company, aims to construct a €276,500,000 “hybrid” power plant. I draw on a
seven-month study conducted in Sitia in 2017—using in-depth interviews, docu-
ment analysis and an ethnographic approach to the “field”—to foreground the
role of the state in enacting intense spatial “restructuring” processes dictated from
“above”. Land grabbing in crisis-ridden Greece has been the object of previous
study (Hadjimichalis 2014a, 2014b), but an empirical, “socially embodied” (Kaika
and Ruggiero 2015) perspective on Sitia’s dispossessed communities helps inform
a hitherto largely theoretical discussion on land dispossession and dissect the
specific mechanisms employed by the state on behalf of investors.
I first discuss how Harvey’s (2003) theory of “accumulation by dispossession”
and Bourdieu’s (1994) concept of the “bureaucratic field” can contribute to our
understanding of contemporary land dispossession and the state’s role in it. After
providing a brief overview of Terna Energy’s “hybrid” power plant, I move on to
explore the shifting functionality of the state’s historical “overlooking” strategy
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vis-a-vis the existing informal, largely unregulated relations on land. What hap-
pens to this institutionally “vulnerable” landscape if there is no market for windy
private land—in a context of growing interest for renewable energy investments,
which makes it highly sought after? It is precisely within the dialectical relation
between historical continuity and rupture with previous regimes that I here
explore the state’s re-regulating role: the transformation of Sitia’s landscape is
made possible through the mobilisation of the state’s bureaucratic and normalis-
ing powers, which reinvent and redefine the concept of forest and dispossess
through classifying land as such.
Dispossession and the “Bureaucratic Field”
While land dispossession (and the active role of the state in it) is by no means a
historically novel phenomenon (Levien 2012), Harvey’s (2003) theory of “accu-
mulation by dispossession” provides a sound basis for conceptually situating dis-
possession under conditions of advanced capitalism (Glassman 2006). In order to
overcome chronic problems of overaccumulation since the end of Fordism, and
profound crises in which expanded reproduction (the accumulation of capital
based on the exploitation of wage labour) becomes more difficult, Harvey sug-
gests that the re-appropriation of surplus value from one class to another requires
new means of accumulation: scouring the earth in its constant search for prof-
itable outlets, capital engages in “accumulation by dispossession”. The latter’s role
is to “release a set of assets (including labour power) at a very low (and in some
instances zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and
immediately turn them to profitable use” (Harvey 2003:149).
“Accumulation by dispossession” originates from Marx’s (1990) own discussion
of “so-called primitive accumulation”; Marx argued that the creation of capital-
ism’s preconditions entails a dual, brutally violent transformation of social rela-
tions: the social means of subsistence and production are turned into capital, and
the producers are turned into wage-labourers. Stripping “primitive accumulation”
off its historicist baggage, and following Rosa Luxemburg’s (2013) footsteps on
the phenomenon’s continuity, Harvey’s (2003) theory helps explain a diverse
range of contemporary forms of dispossession and, most importantly, emphasises
the role of the expropriated asset, land, or resource itself—and not solely the
transformation of its owners.
Despite its tremendous ability of capturing various contemporary forms of dis-
possession, however, “accumulation by dispossession” has been criticised as being
too broadly defined (Bailey 2014; Levien 2012, 2013). By expanding the bound-
aries of the concept too much, according to Robert Brenner (2006:100), Harvey
includes in his concept “a virtual grab bag of processes”—some of which are a
fundamental part of the “already well-established sway of capital”. Linked with
the difficulty of distinguishing between expanded reproduction and “accumula-
tion of dispossession” is Harvey’s failure, according to Levien (2012), to ade-
quately distinguish between the role of economic and “extra-economic”
(including state) force in the dynamics of dispossession. The means-specific char-
acter of “accumulation by dispossession” is, for Levien (2012), the only
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meaningful way of distinguishing it from capitalism’s “ordinary” way of expand-
ing. Responding to this critique, also mounted by Wood (2006), Harvey
(2006a:159) stresses the “incredible interpenetration of state and capital practices
(institutionally, politically and even ideologically)” we are surrounded by; a clear-
cut separation between the “political” and “economic” would therefore not only
produce a “weak theory of the contemporary state”, but also be extremely prob-
lematic in practice. Following Papakonstantinou (2008:117), I agree that what
“accumulation by dispossession” aims to do, then, is emphasise the continuous
character of political violence contrary to the linear logic of its clear separation
from the economic violence embedded into class exploitation. It thus contributes
to a dialectical understanding of “fraudulent” and “predatory” practices within
and because of a system of inherent, structural exploitation.
While I do not see the analytical utility of Bailey’s (2014) and Levien’s (2013)
call for a clear-cut distinction between “economic” and “extra-economic” means
within the dynamics of dispossession, I do agree, however, with their critique that
the state, institutions and agents of capital remain in the abstract in Harvey’s
(2003) work, despite him clearly acknowledging their crucial mediating role. Har-
vey’s theory lacks empirical clarity, and looking at how the neoliberal state appro-
priates land in particular historical and geographical formations can make our
understanding of the political violence of dispossession elsewhere richer. Using
the example of Greece, my aim here is to precisely show how economic purposes
related to land lead to specific ways of achieving these purposes.
Seeking clarification on these ways brings us to the concept of the “bureau-
cratic field”, i.e. Bourdieu’s (1994) conceptualisation of the state as a set of insti-
tutions that control the monopoly of definition and distribution of “public
goods”. Building on the work of Miliband, Gramsci and Poulantzas, Harvey’s
(1976) Marxian theory of the state captures the subtleness and pervasiveness of
the latter as a dynamic institutional and ideological engine which exercises power
through a series of diverse channels: the state controls the flow of ideas and infor-
mation; subordinates the majority through a combination of force and consent;
and internalises political mechanisms of class domination within its administrative
and bureaucratic order. The fragmentary and incoherent nature of the state’s
structure and function, reflective of the dialectic relationship between serving eco-
nomically conceived class interests and exercising political power which lies at its
heart, has the capacity of mystifying it as an “abstract idealization of the common
interest” (Harvey 1976:82). Bourdieu’s (1994) theory goes a long way towards
demystifying the state’s “natural” appearance. Through a historical reconstruction
of its genesis, which brings back into view “the conflicts and confrontations of
the early beginnings and therefore all the discarded possibles” (Bourdieu 1994:4),
the state is conceptualised as a concentration of various (and often antagonistic)
forms of capital (physical, economic, informational and symbolical). It is the inter-
play and struggle between the latter which forms the state’s rule and authority
over different domains—and, by extension, defines the antagonistic relationship
between protecting private property rights and dispossessing private land in the
name of “national interests” in a capitalist modus operandi.
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States have historically been the main agents of dispossessing private land for
“common good”—this process of expropriation is deeply rooted in the legal doc-
trines that have regulated the relationship between government and the institu-
tion of private property since medieval times (Reynolds 2010). For the neoliberal
indebted state, private investments in land are considered a necessary response to
restoring financial stability, and are therefore reframed as responsible governance
(Kallin 2018)—or, when being part of “bailout packages”, as the only possible gov-
ernance, and as a moral obligation to the creditors (Lazzarato 2012). If debt nor-
malises processes of “accumulation by dispossession” as systemic compulsion
(Kallin 2018), states hold the means of imposing and naturalising the above ratio-
nale, and translating it into policy. The neoliberal state is far from a passive recep-
tor of transformations required by “above”: its power is remade, but does not
become less (Harvey 2010; Wacquant 2012). Wacquant (2012:71) situates neolib-
eralism’s institutional core in “an articulation of state, market and citizenship that
harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third” and urges
analytical attention to all three. He employs Bourdieu’s (1994) concept of the
“bureaucratic field” as a powerful tool for understanding the “remaking of the
state as stratification and classification machine”—a series of bureaucratic agen-
cies which naturalise and monopolise, especially by means of symbolic and juridi-
cal power, the definitions and categories of thought that “we spontaneously
apply to all things of the social world” (Bourdieu 1994:1).
Applied to the question of land, such conception of the state, as I argue in this
paper, provides a useful frame for dissecting the state’s bureaucratic methods of
dispossessing land by “failing” to protect it, by classifying it as “forestry”, and by
redefining what the latter means. As becomes clear in the following sections, the
state of dispossession is construed “not as a monolithic and coordinated example,
but as a splintered space of forces vying over the definition and distribution of
public goods” (Wacquant 2010:200).
Terna Energy’s Hybrid Power Plant
Ranging from Europe and the US to North Africa and the Middle East, Gek Terna
Group’s (2018) activity “spans from construction, energy production and supply,
concessions, waste management and mining activities to Real Estate development
& management”—the group claims to have made investments over €1.5 billion “in
the crisis”.1 Terna Energy holds a “leading position” in the Greek energy market,
with approximately 6000 MW of renewable energy projects in operation, under
construction or in an advanced stage of development (Terna Energy 2018). In
Crete, Terna Energy’s plans for a “hybrid” power plant consist of two counterparts:
subproject a, a system of 27 wind turbines situated in Sitia’s mountainous inland, in
Lasithi; and subproject b, a system of pumped-storage hydroelectricity for load bal-
ancing in Potamon Dam in Amari, Rethymnon. I here focus my attention on the for-
cible appropriation of land for subproject a—the windfarms in Sitia.
Crete is still an autonomous grid island and currently widely considered a “re-
newable energy-saturated” system due to the volume of “green” energy already
produced (Sfakianaki 2017). This sets a limit to the number of new windfarms
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that can be installed in the system without destabilising it, and intensifies compe-
tition between energy providers to achieve production licences for their invest-
ments, as only companies which do offer a plan for excess energy use or storage
are given the possibility by the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE)2 to install
new windfarms in Crete (Sfakianaki 2017). Competitors can therefore either
remove the existing “disadvantageous” barrier of Crete’s power autonomy by
implementing a submarine interconnection cable to the mainland,3 or offer stor-
age options for the excess “green” energy. By promising to balance the insuffi-
cient energy demand through the function of the “hybrid” plant’s hydroelectric
pumping system, Terna Energy gets to access, apart from RAE’s production
licence, generous state “compensation”: €6,350,000 per year, a sum that will be
added to the company’s yearly (gross) income of €59,868,330 (Enveco for Terna
Energy 2016). Companies with “hybrids” therefore achieve, argues Sophia (a
member of the Technical Chamber of Eastern Crete), “a competitive advantage
for themselves ... and, as they are compensated at an extremely high price, we
suddenly see fourteen ‘hybrid’ plants scheduled in Crete”.
State support towards Terna’s plant has also been manifested in a Public Private
Partnership between Terna Energy and the (state) Organisation for the Develop-
ment of Crete: a typical case of allocating publicly funded projects (the Potamon
Dam and the island’s power grid) to private investors for long-term “exploitation”
(Sfakianaki 2017), in which “the public sector bears all of the risk and the corpo-
rate sector reaps all of the profit” (Harvey 2006b:25). Potamon Dam was
designed and publicly funded for “the irrigation of the Rethymnon plain and the
reinforcement of the Municipality’s water supply” (Organisation for the Develop-
ment of Crete 2018); these projects were never completed, and the fact that the
“energy exploitation” of the dam was contracted to Terna in 2012 shows the
“intrusion” of big private “players” in projects of such scale in the current finan-
cial, political and legislative context (Sfakianaki 2017).
Terna’s power plant has been resisted, and currently lies at a standstill. In 2016,
the project was unanimously rejected by three community assemblies in Sitanos,
Karydi and Zakros (see Figure 1). Such was the mobilisation and pressure from
opposing residents that Sitia’s Town Council “was forced”, as the Mayor put it him-
self, to reject the investment unanimously. In 2018, after almost two years of relative
stillness, the Region of Crete—in a rather heated Regional Council meeting in Herak-
lion which was massively attended by Sitia’s landowners—evaluated and rejected
Terna’s plans. Any final decision on the plant’s fate lies, however, centrally (in the
hands of the Ministry of Economy and Development); Town and Regional Council
decisions are only of advisory nature when it comes to investments of “national
interest”. As part of a discourse that equates the social and ecological demand for
renewable energy with any business activity and method related to it (Hadjimichalis
2014a), Terna’s power plant is being promoted as a “beneficial project” for Crete
and the whole country: it will substitute imported fuel (oil) and bring capital invest-
ment (Interview, Terna). It is, however, part of a system of fierce internal competi-
tion between “big” investors for a share in the country’s relatively new and
extremely profitable energy market (Sfakianaki 2017)—the political economy of this
new market itself, and the role of speculation “games” around land for “green”
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investments are issues I explore elsewhere (Korfiati 2019). My aim here is to dissect
the particular fashion in which dispossession occurs in Sitia: how do investors access
land, if all the windy properties are private, and not for sale in the market?
Non-Regulating as State Strategy? The Shifting
“Functionality” of Informal Land Practices
[Ι]t must be made clear that laissez-faire too is a form of State “regulation”, intro-
duced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, con-
scious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic
facts. (Gramsci 1971:371)
If implemented, Terna’s 27 wind turbines will occupy a surface area of at least
6,872,604 m2 of land (Enveco for Terna Energy 2016) at the “heart” of Sitia’s
Figure 1: Eastern Lasithi and the Hybrid Plant’s Windfarm Installation Area (source:
edited by the author, using background map from https://www.openstreetma
p.org and data from http://www.sitia-geopark.gr and Enveco for Terna Energy
[2016])
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(UNESCO) Geopark and in close proximity to Sitanos, Karydi, Adravasti, Skalia,
Mitato, Chonos, and Ano Zakros (see Figure 1). Some of these are traditional set-
tlements (dated before 1830 and mostly saved unaltered) and include important
archaeological findings of which only few have been officially declared. Locals
argue that Terna’s plans pose a serious threat to the use-values (simply put, the
material uses of a commodity that can satisfy needs—as opposed to exchange-
value, the relative price of a commodity when exchanged for other commodities)
they generate and the productive activities they practice on land inherited from
their families (agriculture, apiculture, stockraising, hiking, speleological, archaeo-
logical tourism etc.); the very existence of the Geopark itself; and the area’s fragile
water supply (Opposing Residents of Sitia 2017). According to Harris, a member
of Sitia’s Town Council, “it is common practice for landowners to rent the land
out to shepherds and get rent in the form of cheese. These are private pieces of
land, but without any property titles: any transactions related to them are there-
fore informal”. Informal practices on Sitia’s land, as I explore in the section that
follows, as well as state “failure” to implement measures of environmental and
archaeological protection, produce a landscape with no institutional barriers to dis-
possession.
Spatial politics in the modern Greek capitalist state were founded on the basis
of (small) private property as the only “healthy base” of the national economic
politics (Mantouvalou 2005). Private property, especially in (semi)agrarian set-
tings, was however never fully realised: land is more than a means of production
that can be valued economically, and its valuation cannot be reduced to the “sin-
gularity of private property” (Levien 2013). In Crete, land spatialises a long line of
inheritance within the same family or community, and locals often take customary
laws for granted. According to Emilios, a member of the Ecological Group of Sitia,
properties in Sitia’s mountainous inland are technically private, but land is seldom
treated as an asset to buy or sell, and property boundaries are frequently defined
by approximation. In other words, most locals lack what Anne Haila (2017) has
called the “property mind”; they do not have “a culture of property” and knowl-
edge around or interest in land markets. Informal property and labour relations
on land, which are coexistent with (if not necessary for) fully marketised and reg-
ulated spheres of capitalist society (Fraser 2014), have been so far largely over-
looked by the local and the national state: the lack of a complete National
Cadastre results in uncertainty around land ownership titles (and the series of
undocumented transactions on it); and the unclear regime of land use makes, in
turn, the possibilities and restrictions of any activities practiced or planned on it
unclear.
These practices of “non-regulation” are part of the state’s “overlooking” strat-
egy which has served a long-term and cross-class “functionality”. “Any land-
scape”, as Don Mitchell (2008:35–36) highlights, “is (or was) functional”:
produced through the investment of capital in it, landscape can potentially yield
(or serve as a site for the realisation of) exchange-value; and, landscape estab-
lishes the necessary conditions for the reproduction of the labour power required
for the above. As part of this double functionality, the dynamics of state neglect,
lack of regulation and informality in the Greek countryside have so far produced
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uneven and marginalised but dynamic local economies which should not be seen
as “underdeveloped” or “delayed”: contrary to a “stagist” understanding of capi-
talism, they should rather be viewed as a manifestation of uneven geographical
development in the country (Vaiou and Hadjimichalis 1997). Land dispossession
in Greece “did not commence with the crisis”; “micro-dispossessions for use-
value” comprise “a timeless characteristic of Greek society”, with thousands of
land-grabs by individuals, businesses, monasteries and municipalities for cultiva-
tion, housing and all sorts of illegal constructions in the countryside and urban
peripheries (Hadjimichalis 2014b:505–506). These laissez-faire practices have his-
torically contributed to the social and geographical diffusion of rent and the for-
mation of a broad small property “class” (Mantouvalou 2005). This particular
regime of social reproduction has been dominant since at least the early 19th cen-
tury, forging a wide informal societal (including state) consent for its maintenance
(Mantouvalou 2005; Tsoukalas 1986).
The landscape’s functionality is, however, a dynamic process, and shifts to
accommodate capital’s changing needs. Since the 1990s, spatial planning in
Greece was stripped of any social and public priority and started encouraging
entrepreneurial targets within a framework of competitiveness and international
appeal (Vourekas 2013). The growing financialisation, large-scale land-deals and
the preparation for the 2004 Athens Olympiad (Kalatzopoulou and Mpelavilas
2014) led to a shift from micro-dispossessions for use-value to macro-disposses-
sions for exchange-value (Hadjimichalis 2014b); land has since been dispossessed
by new elites, large developers, banks and monasteries, and often met with (vio-
lent) resistance (Calvario et al. 2017). So far used for use-values and small-scale
economic activities, Sitia’s loosely regulated landscape attracts generalised pres-
sure for various kinds of large-scale, often speculative investments on land (with
touristic real estate and energy investments as the tip of the spear). The fragmen-
tary framework of spatial planning, as Sophia puts it, was:
intentionally left unstructured. Who ever tried to structure it? ... Any existing planning
law in the post-war period was never implemented, and suddenly they froze every-
thing since the 90s to make new, convenient planning laws, and authorised these
instead. These are tragic stories...what kind of state are we talking about then? A state
that intentionally does not exercise its role.
This becomes evident in the state’s inadequacy to “protect”. Yannis, a landowner
in Sitanos, argues that state “failure” to officially demarcate important archaeo-
logical sites on Sitia’s mountains is part of “a systematic and planned undermin-
ing of this area to make the creation of these [wind]farms possible from 2005
onwards”. The provisional demarcation of the archaeological sites located within
the Municipality of Sitia was a prerequisite for the Ministry of Culture to approve
Sitia’s General Urban Plan (GUP) in 2007. But back then, argues Sara, a land-
owner in Sitanos, some of the GIS maps which accompanied the GUP “did not
even show the villages ... They did not even include the archaeological sites, the
ones that were declared ... So, what did the investor see? Pastures! They saw a
place with an excellent wind potential, and nothing else. A wasteland”. If Sitanos,
Katsidoni, and Karydi were declared as traditional settlements, argues Stella, a
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member of the Town Council of Sitia, “specific minimum distances would need
to be maintained—so the 27 wind turbines would not fit”. While it is hard to
prove that the Archaeological Commission planned to leave Sitia’s archaeological
sites unprotected, local archaeologists argue that such negligence derives from
the neoliberalisation of the state itself: there is, for example, “such terrible under-
staffing” that many archaeologists are forced to evaluate whether sites should be
protected or not without in situ inspections.
In a similar vein, the Independent Operators meant to be established by the
state in order to clearly define and regulate the neighbouring Natura 2000 envi-
ronmentally protected areas were never set up. Additionally, according to Fanis,
the coordinator of Geoparks in Greece, Geoparks do not have any legal substance
in the national legislative framework. In theory, only the “biodiversity law” (Law
3937/2011) foresees the operation of Geoparks in the form of regional or national
parks. In practice, however, the recognition of Geoparks under Law 3937 presup-
poses a “legislative procedure” which involves the submission of a “special study”
which has not been defined: “the specifications of this ‘special study’ are not pro-
vided. Nobody knows what this study is about ... The Ministry clearly doesn’t
want to go ahead with this” (Interview, Fanis). Determining the above legislative
procedure would define land uses and areas of protection and would impose
some restrictions on investments within the Geopark’s limits.
Following capital’s changing needs, the absence of land contracts, clear prop-
erty boundaries, registered land uses, and effective layers of protection serve the
neoliberal project of “reengineering” rather than “dismantling” the state (Wac-
quant 2012). In the following sections I explore a combination of state strategies
that not only produce a landscape with no institutional barriers to dispossession—
but actively re-regulate the legislation and its practice, shift the role of the forest
as a public good, and bypass the question of private ownership over land by clas-
sifying it as “forestry”.
Land Framed as “Forestry”: Dispossession by
Classification
Through the framing it imposes upon practices, the state establishes and inculcates
common forms and categories of perception and appreciation, social frameworks of
perceptions, of understanding or of memory, in short state forms of classification.
(Bourdieu 1994:13)
“What is interesting with the energy projects”, Sophia stresses, “is that they func-
tion according to the ‘whoever secures the land first’ rule. Therefore, since 2010,
when some legislative issues were taken care of, or even since 2008, in the pro-
spect that they would be taken care of, big stretches of land were involved in
deals with listed companies”. Terna has received a production licence and con-
ducted an EIS study for the “hybrid” plant, but has not dealt with ownership
issues of the “secured” land yet. This is indicative, argues Sara, of the “simple fact
that investors take land for granted: they have been planning investments on land
which they haven’t even checked if it’s public or private ... they just say, I’ll make
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my project here! They are certain they’ll get it”. I here explore where this cer-
tainty derives from, and I pay particular attention to the role of the state in pro-
viding that certainty.
Large investments have already been implemented in the area, including more
than 90 MW worth of windfarms (Municipality of Sitia 2014). Thanos, the presi-
dent of Katsidoni, argues that Sitia is already “saturated” in terms of the renew-
able energy produced but also of spatial planning; multiple stretches of land are
already occupied by renewable energy investments. Initially, locals did not have
negative reactions to the latter, as opposed to the current widespread negative
sentiment vis-a-vis large-scale renewable energy investments; many argue that
there are qualitative differences in the way the first energy investments were car-
ried out in the area: back then, companies contacted the locals “like humans”,
paid fair prices for the land, and made topographical plans (Interview, Thanos).
Ironically, for some, identifying the exact location of their properties and creating
formal contracts served as a way of securing their properties later, against the
ongoing dispossession efforts of investors and the state (Interview, Thanos). This
reflects a clear shift in the role of the renewable energy industry in the country,
which escalated from small-scale and often state-led investments in the 1990s to
widespread large-scale investments within a generalised narrative of “green
growth” and the gradual liberalisation of the domestic energy market. I am here
not interested in analysing the formulation of the new “green” discourse around
land per se, but rather in exploring the power of the state to act on this new nar-
rative through adjusting old, well instituted tools; creating new categories of
thought translated into law under conditions of “urgency”; and shifting existing
definitions to meet new ends.
Nestoras occupies a high position in the department of Protection, Administra-
tion and Management of Forests in the Decentralised Administration of Crete.
“The crucial element for investors”, as he puts it, “is whether the land is suitable
for windfarms. Investigating the question of property is secondary to them”. In
the EIS’s list (Enveco for Terna Energy 2016) of selected (mainly technical) criteria
for the proposed installation area, not once do the authors refer directly to the
question of land ownership—a significant absence which was also reflected in my
interview with the project’s representatives. The consideration of costs over the
question of land is indicative of the financial ease with which investors acquire
properties. This is reflected in Terna’s subproject’s budget breakdown: a total of
€7,500,000 is foreseen for “environmental rehabilitation, land acquisition and
unpredictable factors” (Enveco for Terna Energy 2016), all bundled together at
the bottom of the list. Τhis represents, in total, only about 2.7% of the
€276,500,000 estimated total investment cost. Bringing land-related costs down,
however, is not enough if there is no land on the market for sale. How are local
landowners dispossessed of their private land? In a state that is desperately eager
to give land away in the name of “national interests”, forcibly transforming pri-
vate land into public land is an act of accumulation by dispossession. This allows:
the contemporary “investors”, these ... neophytes, Terna and the like, [to] come here
in the form of a conqueror and go and classify areas ... Forestry areas are public land.
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They declassify the areas [from private agricultural], they go to the forestry authorities,
they pay the public fee etc., and they say, “I’ll make a windfarm”. And they don’t care
about anything. Inevitably, therefore, the local community will react. (Interview, Tha-
nos)
This “conquering” mechanism can be stripped down to two interlinked state
strategies: the first exploits the relationship between forestry land and ownership
rights over this land; and the second transforms the meaning and role of the forest
as a public good.
From Private Land to Public Forestry Land
All forestry land in Greece is considered by presumption public. But Crete, the
Ionian Islands, the Cyclades and the Dodecanese are exceptions to this general
rule. In Sitia, the classification of land as forestry should not directly affect land
ownership issues due to Crete’s peculiar landownership regime. Following the
Cretan Revolution and before its annexation by Greece, the island went through
the transitional stage of the autonomous Cretan State (1986-1913), which led to
a different landownership regime when it comes to, inter alia, forests, forestry and
grassland areas; the Cretan Civil Code resulted in legal particularities, but also a
different “psychology” vis-a-vis landownership in Crete, which involves strong ele-
ments of family inheritance rules instead of legal titles (Papadakis 2017). The own-
ership of forests, forestry and grassland areas in Crete is not considered by
presumption public, and most properties on Cretan mountains are private. In case
the land is contested, in theory the state, similarly to private individuals, needs to
prove its ownership over the land (Law 998/79, Article 62). Simos, a landowner-
ship lawyer, argues that this particularity is “in practice not respected, which
results in individual landowners being forced to turn to expensive lawsuits against
the state to recognise it as private grassland or forestry ... which can take years,
because the state exhausts all the steps”. Court rulings in land dispute cases vary
largely on the approach taken by individual judges, with some justifying landown-
ers and others granting the land to the public by presumption or taking interme-
diate approaches (Interview, Pavlos/member of the Regional Council of Chania).
The pressure exerted over the outcome of court proceedings is related to the
shifting role of the forest as a public good. Ιn practice, any privately-owned area
which is classified as forestry land or grassland is claimed by the state as public for-
estry land: it can then be leased to renewable energy investors for a “public” fee
of just €50 per acre, the so-called “beekeeper price”. Accumulation by disposses-
sion involves a fix, as Arrighi (2004:531) puts it, which involves the “forcible or
fraudulent appropriation of something for nothing, rather than the exchange of
nominally equivalent values”.
From Public Forestry Land to Renewable Energy Investments
It is precisely the private nature of Sitia’s mountainous land, as Orionas, a member
of the PanCretan Network Against Industrial-Scale RES, points out, that creates
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the need for “legislation that essentially allows for the state to get the landowner
out of the way”. This legislation, although intensified and supplemented with
new regulatory measures amidst the crisis, has been facilitating “green” invest-
ments as early as 2001 (Law 2941), when they were prioritised as “projects of
public interest”. They can since be implemented within forestry areas regardless
of the implementing body and are still valid even if the land is legally recognised
as privately owned. In practice, this means that investors can implement renew-
able energy developments anywhere they like, if the area is “forestry”, or classified
as such by the Forestry Commission (Interview, Sophia). Expropriations of pri-
vately owned land were made possible, and the Forestry Commission is since enti-
tled to expel and impose sanctions on shepherds. In 2006 (Law 3468, a first form
of “fast-track” law), crucially, the question of scale was introduced: “large-scale”
investments (of at least 30 MW of power and €30 million budget) are since priori-
tised. In continuation of Law 2941/2001, the 2008 “Spatial Framework for the
Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development for the RES” (Article 6) “imposed
the implementation of RES projects literally in every corner of the countryside”
that did not have a Presidential Decree for protection (Interview, Sophia):
“National Parks, protected natural formations, preserved monuments of nature,
protected landscapes and areas of eco-development” (Law 1650/1986, Article
19), and “Important Bird Areas” (IBA 2000 and European Directive 92/43/EC) are
not deemed incompatible with RES projects.
Prior to the commencement of any work related to the installation of their pro-
jects, the investing companies apply to the competent Forestry Commission for
the land to be classified. This process does not require the applicants to produce
titles of land ownership or the owners’ consent; any company can apply for the
classification of any stretch of land anywhere, regardless of who owns it. It is
therefore common practice for prospective investors to apply for the classification
of areas much larger than necessary for their immediate needs, possibly to secure
their future plans in the region (PanCretan Network Against Industrial-Scale RES
2012). The whole process has been accelerated during the crisis: according to
Law 3851/2010 (Article 12), the classification act is now issued by the Forestry
Commission as a matter of priority—within a single month from the application
submission.
Temporality is an important incentive for investors to avoid seeking contact
with individual landowners: they ask for the land to be classified, and “since it will
be classified as forestry, or grassland, they go to the state and lease it. And they
bypass the question of ownership ... They think, this is an immediate form [of
ownership]” (Simos, original emphasis). It is also common for companies to follow
“a middle ground solution” to avoid delays by preventing landowners from taking
legal action:
they [the Forestry Commission] classify [the land] as public forestry, but then ... here
comes the investor, and they find you, who owns the mountain, and they say “I’ll
give you €5,000 a year” ... who will say no? It’s a proper income. €10,000, I don’t
even know how much. Black money. (Interview, Pavlos)
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Taking advantage of the landowners’ relative ignorance, companies approach
them and offer them long-term rents and contracts of questionable validity: their
aim is to secure their consent until the project is installed. As soon as the area is
classified as forestry and transferred to state administration, companies might stop
paying the former landowners (if they ever did) (PanCretan Network Against
Industrial-Scale RES 2012). It is convenient for investors to use the “classification
mechanism”, Sophia stresses:
because in this way they have nothing to do with the individual ... but they deal with
the state instead, a much easier task with so much public forestry land around ... The
state will gladly give it to them and will not bring any objection. As opposed to the
others [landowners], who may beg them, pressure them, or bind them with a con-
tract so they are forced to pay much more. So why should they deal with the private
owners and not with the state, which promotes this as policy anyway?
The role of the local administrative authorities is crucial in interpreting and imple-
menting the law before the case goes to court. Therefore, apart from the strength
of the wind, the investors pick land “on the basis of who their local collaborators
are” (Interview, Sophia). Yannis agrees that this “classification mechanism” is a
matter of “collusion between the state, and the municipality, with the various
mayors etc., and big investors. This is crystal clear”. Corruption within the local
administration was identified by many participants as an important dimension of
this “collusion”. According to Menios, who is in danger of losing his land in Sita-
nos:
palms are being greased here ... everything is accomplished through that: the forestry
inspector came here and told me my own land is forestry. But everyone around here
knows that it’s not! And because my late father-in-law planted a single eucalyptus,
and five oleander plants ... it became a forest.
But the “classification mechanism” and its implementation is the outcome of, as
Sophia puts it, more “structural shifts”:
I would formulate this differently; that in that way there is a strong incentive to turn
properties into forestry land. Which means that, even if they don’t grease their [civil
servants’] palm ... they will now pressure or request them for ... one thing that the
whole propaganda says, along with Ms. Birbili [former Minister of Environment], and
then the Council of State as well, that is the useful thing to do for the social interest.
(Interview, original emphasis)
Spatial policy involves both a material and symbolic element—in Sitia, what
changes is also the symbolic role of the forest, as a “public good” which is, as it
stands, “undercapitalised” and “not green enough”. Renewable energy invest-
ments therefore bear a symbolic weight that kills two birds with one stone: the
land is “developed” and investment capital “flows in”, and the forest becomes
greener. The above presupposes a transformation in the very definition of what
constitutes forestry land to begin with. Apart from changes in the legislation itself,
the interpretation of whether land is forestry or not via in situ autopsies, which
often falls on the shoulders of a single civil servant, is a crucial part of this
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transformation. The state’s “neoliberal reengineering”, as Wacquant (2010:72)
puts it, employs, among other institutional logics, “the trope of individual respon-
sibility as motivating discourse and cultural glue that pastes ... various compo-
nents of state activity together”.
This “siege ring” of the state and companies around the land is primarily a class
conflict, since most landowners are unable to afford the expenses of a legal dis-
pute. In theory, private landowners can object to the classification of their land as
forestry; but in practice the process is costly, and takes time—on average, it takes
more than five years for the objection request to be discussed by the Primary
Commission alone. For the objection process to stand a chance of winning, the
applicant needs (apart from hiring a specialist lawyer) to produce, beside property
titles or the proven usucaption over the land, a special photo interpretation of the
1945 or 1960 aerial photos of the area (from the Hellenic Military Geographical
Service). In short, thousands of euros are required for the lawyers’ fees, photo
interpretations etc. for an “extremely dubious vindication” (PanCretan Network
Against Industrial-Scale RES 2012). In this sense, argues Yannis, “all these acres of
land ... we are talking about pieces of millions of square meters ... are practically
confiscated”. Company tactics of “buying” land also reproduces and reinforces
class divisions between the inhabitants themselves, as their need to take the
“breadcrumbs” offered by the company in return for their land varies; this “builds
consensus” and “breaks the reaction front” (Interview, Yannis). Local landowners
are, essentially, left with two options: to simply give the land away, if they cannot
afford the costs of a legal dispute; or to forcibly sell it at extremely low prices.
Refusing to conform, many are concentrating their efforts in scrutinising the com-
pany’s legal grounds and EIS argumentation, and preparing their case for a
potential appeal to the Council of State.
Conclusion
“What spaces are left in the global economy for new spatial fixes for capital sur-
plus absorption?” asked David Harvey in the final chapter of The Enigma of Capital
(2010:217). These spaces are, as I argue in this paper, manufactured, and “there
is nothing automatic”, as Levien (2013:16) puts it, “about capital (overaccumu-
lated or not) finding outlets in land or any other asset”. The space of disposses-
sion is not “just discovered at the edge” (Tsing 2003:5100): it is produced, and
the neoliberal indebted state assumes a crucial role in this process. In this paper I
focused my attention on the state’s role in the transformation of private, highly
fragmented property (mainly) for use-values and small-scale economic activities to
public property for pending renewable energy investments from big investors.
Turning land into public property leads to its (re)commodification, and new forms
of state classification emerge as major drivers of dispossession. This paper reaf-
firms the crucial role of the state in the political economy of land dispossession
and sheds light on underexplored forms this role is manifested in.
Attention to state dynamics in processes of accumulation by dispossession is of
crucial importance for three main reasons. First, it emphasises the political nature
of the forcible appropriation of land for large-scale investments and dissects its
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close interrelation with economic pressures from investors. Attracting and promot-
ing specific kinds of investments, controlling the definition of “public goods”
through symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1994), and (re)commodifying land through
its forcible incorporation in the public domain are all state affairs. When land is
not available in the market, and investors cannot simply purchase it, as is the case
with Sitia’s mountainous private properties, states need to be willing to find ways
of expropriating land for them; Crete’s particularity exposes the lengths at which
the state is prepared to go in order to appropriate land on behalf of investors.
This argument follows “transformationist” approaches to state theory, which
advance the idea that states are not dismantled under contemporary capitalism—
they are qualitatively transformed (Brenner 2004). The state of dispossession pro-
tects (or fails to protect) property rights; allocates land uses and decides what
kind of spatial plans can be applied where; and decides what parts of the land
are worth protecting (i.e. environmentally or archeologically) and what this pro-
tection means (see also Apostolopoulou and Adams 2015).
Second, the state of dispossession promotes the appropriation of land for
investments from below. The transformation of private productive land into public
forestry land, accomplished through the mobilisation of the state’s juridical and
bureaucratic power of land classification, takes shape in a local mechanism of
interpreting and enforcing the law. What happens at a national level is not
enough to explain the mechanism of dispossession, and the national state should
not be assumed to be a monolithic agent—nor should it be blurred with the
municipality (the local government) (Haila 2016). In a dialectic relationship
between individual agency and structure, decisions of local governmental officials
and employees are motivated by and produced through a combination of lack of
funds and understaffing (such as in the case of the Archaeological Commission);
(indications of) acts of micro-corruption and self-interest seeking; and finally, the
genuine urge to serve a specific type of “public good”. If the state is able to
define, serve, and naturalise the latter through symbolic violence, as I have argued
following Bourdieu (1994:4) and his concept of the “bureaucratic field”, it is “be-
cause it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific
organisational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of men-
tal structures and categories of perception and thought”. Dispossessing land on
behalf of capital for “green” purposes and the “national interest” here presents
itself as the only possible policy option, and therefore “has all the appearances of
the natural” (Bourdieu 1994:4)—it becomes the duty of every individual and
every region to contribute to the task of attracting capital flows through invest-
ments in land. This reflects Neil Brenner’s (2004) argument about rescaling as a
fundamental part of the remaking of the neoliberal state towards a growth-ori-
ented and competitiveness-driven direction: not only cities and city-regions but
also rural areas should not be treated as “mere subunits of national administrative
systems”: they are an essential part of the state’s reworking on a national level.
The naturalisation of attracting all kinds of investments as a “public good” is cru-
cial, as it also helps explain why local governments, similarly to the state on a
national level, favour land acquisitions despite being close to local interests.
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Third, looking at state mechanisms of dispossession highlights the dialectic rela-
tionship of both rupture and continuity between crisis and inherited, path-depen-
dent relations embedded in land. Why is the state willing to dispossess, while it
has diachronically preserved a wide, cross-class alliance which reproduced the
social and geographical diffusion of rents? Changes in forestry legislation and the
definition and perception of the forest as a public good were put in motion since
2001, and accumulation by dispossession occurs on a landscape that has been
inadequately protected, controlled, and regulated by the state for years before
the outburst of the crisis. I have analysed this lack of regulation as a form of regu-
lation, and as an important part of a diachronic strategy of the Greek capitalist
state that has served a cross-class and long-term “functionality”. But the “success”
of the neoliberal state (national or local), as Harvey (2010:197) puts it, is increas-
ingly “measured by the degree to which it captures flows of capital” and “builds
the conditions favourable to further capital accumulation within its borders”, and
regions compete to achieve the above. This competitive pressure is not the pro-
duct of the financial crisis itself; especially under conditions of crisis, however, cap-
turing flows of capital is directly perceived as a state mechanism of paying back
the debt: indebtedness, fiscal constraints, and “restructuring” are reinforcing the
strategy of both cities and the countryside to attract investments. Dispossession,
however, does not occur in a moment, and it is a process—not an act. In the
“Right to the City”, Lefebvre (1996:104) approached his study of the production
of urban space through the dialectic relations between “continuities and disconti-
nuities”. The spatial manifestations of the crisis should be looked, following his
thought, as both a continuation of previous regimes and a moment of rupture
with them; and, following Gramsci’s spatial historicism (Ekers et al. 2013), pro-
cesses of accumulation by dispossession cannot be explained without looking
back, and without placing the state’s role in its historical (dis)continuity.
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Endnotes
1 Gek Terna Group consists of Terna, Terna Energy, Terna Mag, and is also part of Heron
(see http://www.heron.gr).
2 RAE is an independent administrative authority (Law 2773/1999), which was issued
within the framework of the harmonisation of the Hellenic Law to the provisions of Direc-
tive 96/92/EC for the liberalisation of the electricity market.
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3 The fierce competition between the different interconnection plans (almost worth €4 bil-
lion in total) is indicative of the scale of the profitability of the new “green” energy market
nationally and beyond, but also Crete’s crucial geopolitical location in it.
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